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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In a sense, all debts are odious; that is, to use dictionary definitions, 
“hateful; disgusting; offensive.”1 Yet insofar as international economic law 
today is concerned, only a certain few debts can be considered “odious debts” 
in order to contest and perhaps eventually to repudiate them. In this article, the 
concepts of odious debt and related international legal phenomena will be 
examined, in both historical and contemporary context, with a view of 
determining the role that denomination of certain debts as odious may play in 
the overall process of sovereign debt rescheduling. 
The article begins with a brief description of the concept of odious debt. It 
then proceeds to assess other fundamental doctrines of international law which 
relate to the ultimate determination of some debts as odious. Once this basis 
has been established, the article undertakes a brief historical survey of both the 
de facto and de jure invocation of odious debt as a rationale for renunciation of 
sovereign debt obligations, culminating with a quick tour of recent 
reconceptualizations of odious debt doctrines in connection with both Jubilee 
2000 and the Iraqi debt incurred by Saddam Hussein’s regime. It concludes with 
a consideration of new proposals to create international institutions to deal with 
future odious debt claims. 
II 
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
LAW ISSUES: STATE SUCCESSION AND ODIOUS DEBT 
At international law, a successor government is liable for the financial 
obligations incurred by a prior regime. Changes in the government of a state do 
not usually alter previously existing rights and obligations.2  Thus, as a general 
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 1. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1240 (2d ed. 1972). 
 2. Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ala. 1981). 
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matter, successor governments must honor the debts incurred by predecessor 
regimes. Many new revolutionary regimes, on the other hand, have asserted 
both the longevity and wide acceptance of the principle that successor 
governments could renounce “odious debts” contracted by predecessor 
regimes. Having risen to power as a revolutionary regime, such polities 
characterize all financial obligations of previous reactionary governments as 
such “odious debts” and refuse to pay. 
The history and the development of the doctrines in this area—state 
succession—must be carefully analyzed in order to establish some benchmarks 
for assessing the international acceptance of this position. In considering the 
merits of the different claims, it also must be kept in mind that widely varying 
historical experience, both with international law and with foreign relations and 
trade, have had significant impact on the current stances not only of the United 
States, but also of large groupings of nations such as developed countries, on 
the one hand, and the developing, or third-world, countries on the other. Only a 
careful analysis of the present international legal doctrine that also takes into 
account the breadth of global culture underlying it will permit a proper 
understanding of the future direction of international law. 
One fairly typical case, involving a claim of repudiation of sovereign debt as 
odious was the 1981 case, Jackson v. People’s Republic of China.3 In 
determining that the government of the People’s Republic of China  (PRC) was 
liable to holders of the bonds, the district court in the Jackson default judgment 
briefly summarized its analysis of the international law of state succession. 
Citing only a single case4 decided over fifty years ago, the court announced, “It 
is an established principle of international law that ‘changes in the government 
or the internal policy of a state do not as a rule affect its position in 
international law.’”5 Following that principle, the court simply deduced that the 
PRC government, as the successor to the Imperial Chinese government, was 
therefore the successor to the prior government’s obligations and thus liable for 
the payments due on plaintiffs’ bonds. The court summarily disposed of the 
issue in a single paragraph.6 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1927) (Manton, J., opinion) 
(quoting 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1906)). The quoted passage 
from Moore states, 
Changes in the government or the internal policy of a state do not as a rule affect its position 
in international law. A monarchy may be transformed into a republic, or a republic into a 
monarchy; absolute principles may be substituted for constitutional, or the reverse; but, 
though the government changes, the nation remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired. 
Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 21 F.2d at 401 (Manton, J., opinion). 
 5. Jackson, 550 F. Supp. at 872 (quoting MOORE, supra note 4, at 249). 
 6. Jackson, supra note 2, at 872. 
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A. Theories of State Succession 
In fact, there does not appear to be any universal rule of international law 
with regard to state succession. Although there is considerable support for the 
position that a successor government should be liable for the obligations 
incurred by its predecessors,7 there is a competing minority argument that 
succession of one government severs it so completely from its predecessors that 
it has no responsibility for the acts and obligations of preceding governments.8  
However, several nations whose governments came to power as a result of 
revolutionary activity have developed a legal theory between these two extreme 
views of international law. This intermediary view holds that revolutionary 
regimes may succeed to certain obligations of their predecessors but do not 
have any responsibility for so-called “odious debts,” a term used to describe 
debts incurred in opposition to a revolution or for other oppressive purposes.9 
The U.S. interpretation of international law places it clearly among the 
group of nations—most of them creditor countries—that upholds state 
succession to a predecessor’s debts, no matter what the change of government. 
The interpretation of revolutionary regimes, such as the PRC,10 though 
 
 7. See, e.g., ERNEST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 623–42 (1931); 
D. P. O’CONNELL, 1 STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–14, 369–415 (2d 
ed. 1967); HERBERT A. WILKINSON, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF STATE SUCCESSION 71–96 (1934). 
See also 2 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 810–11 (1963) (obligation of 
the successor state is to respect the acquired rights of the predecessor state). 
 8. See, e.g., FEILCHENFELD, supra note 7, at 535–45; O’CONNELL, supra note 7, at 14–17; 
WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 71–96. See also Tinoco Case (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R. Int’l Arb. 
Awards 369, 376–84 (1923), reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT’L. L. 147 (1924) (holding that the Law of Nullities 
passed by the restored Costa Rican government rendered oil-grant concession granted by the 
predecessor government invalid; but, with respect to debt owed by the predecessor government to a 
British bank, the successor government ordered to assign interest in mortgage upon Tinoco estate to 
bank and bank to then deliver money owed to successor). See M. H. Hoeflich, Through a Glass Darkly: 
Reflections Upon the History of the International Law of Public Debt in Connection with State 
Succession, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 39, 60–65 (1982). 
 9. See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 7 at 337–42, 450–52, 701–05, 862; O’CONNELL, supra note 7, at 
356, n. 5; WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 83–86. The commentators generally divide “odious debts” into 
two types: hostile debts and war debts. Hostile debts are those debts imposed upon a community 
against its will, without consent and adverse to the community’s best interests. The leading example of 
a hostile debt is the Cuban debt, which caused controversy between the United States and Spain in 
1898. The American government vigorously took the position that the debts resulted from the actions 
of the Spanish government for its own colonial ambitions and that Cuba had no say in these actions. 
The then-prevailing American political philosophy did not acknowledge that incurring such a debt 
might actually be beneficial; these debts were considered repugnant. War debts are those debts used to 
finance aggressive campaigns against other states or against the successor state. A war debt of this type 
was incurred following the annexation of the Boer Republics by Great Britain in 1900. The British 
government refused to repay notes issued as security for loans, the proceeds of which were used to 
wage war. As to both kinds of debts, the theory is that such debts were raised for purposes other than 
the needs and interests of the state; since there was no benefit from the indebtedness incurred, the 
successor has no obligation to repay such debts. 
 10. See Aide Memoire [of U.S. Dep’t of State in Jackson], Aide Memoire of Chinese Foreign 
Ministry on Case of Huguang Railway Bearer Bonds, Feb. 2, 1983, in Xinhua News Agency Release, 
Feb. 9, 1983, U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-83-
028, Feb. 9, 1983, at B-1, reprinted in 22 INT’L LEGAL MATS. 81 (1983) [hereinafter Aide Memoire]. The 
PRC has taken note of United States’ invocation of “odious debt” rationales for refusing to honor 
predecessor-regime obligations in several instances. See, e.g., Richard Tien-Shi Hsu, The Invalidity of 
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borrowing some of the “odious debt” rhetoric of other countries, seems to 
adopt the most extreme nonsuccession theory in regard to external debts. 
Underlying these competing statements are certain equitable considerations 
that may furnish a common ground for explaining and reconciling their 
differences. 
The principles evinced by nations maintaining that successor governments 
inherit the obligations of their predecessors are most often discussed under the 
rubric of “acquired rights.”11 If one accepts the “acquired rights” analysis, 
international law imposes the relationship between the lender of money to 
sovereign borrowers (or, in this situation, the buyers of government-issued 
bonds) to the successors of such sovereign governments, to prevent the unjust 
result of extinguishing the lender’s (or buyer’s) interest in repayment because of 
the sovereign borrower’s disappearance.12 Respect for “acquired rights” at 
international law has been described as “no more than a principle that change 
of sovereignty should not touch the interests of individuals more than is 
necessary.”13 A further argument under the “acquired rights” analysis is that a 
successor government recognizing such rights retains the power to permit it to 
continue, alter, or cancel those rights, with appropriate provisions for 
compensation if it alters or cancels previously existing rights.14 This analysis 
 
the Default Judgment in Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 569, 575–76 (1983) 
(discussing Cuban and Texas debt). 
 11. O’CONNELL, supra note 7, at 237–68. Discussing the working of the theory to protect a lender’s 
interest in repayment where the predecessor government to which he lent has been succeeded, 
O’Connell writes, 
What is always ‘inherited’ is the state of facts which the now extinguished legal relationship 
has brought about; and the equitable interest which the lender has in this factual situation is as 
much an ‘acquired right,’ ‘property right’ or ‘vested right’ as the interest of a titleholder in 
tangible property. The obligation of the successor state is to respect this interest. It is not an 
obligation derived from the predecessor, but one imposed ab exteriore by international law. It 
rises when the successor, through its own action in extending its sovereignty, becomes 
competent to destroy the titleholder’s interest. The general principle in which this obligation is 
embodied, and which underlies the whole problem of state succession, is the principle that 
acquired rights must be respected. 
Id. at 238–39. 
 12. Id. See also WHITEMAN, supra note 7, at 810–11 (the obligation to honor acquired rights arises 
when a successor is enabled through its own action to eliminate the title holder’s interest). 
 13. O’CONNELL, supra note 7, at 266. 
 14. Id. O’Connell writes, 
This does not mean that these interests may not be interfered with at all. The doctrine merely 
indemnifies titleholders from complete and arbitrary destruction of their interests, and secures 
for them an impartiality on the part of the successor State in the exercise of its discretion. 
There can be no general immunity from expropriating legislation. Such expropriation, 
however, is only justified when accompanied by a recognition of the equities involved. If the 
doctrine of acquired rights does not protect the titleholders from expropriation, it at least 
guarantees them restitution. The successor State, once it extends its sovereignty over the 
absorbed area, has a choice as to the course it will adopt. On the one hand it may permit 
acquired rights to continue in existence; on the other hand, it may legislate to alter or entirely 
cancel them. If it adopts the latter course it must then comply with the minimum standards set 
by international law, and either pay compensation or grant new titles of some equivalent 
value. A successor State thus stands in the same position with respect to acquired rights as any 
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does not extend the principles so far as to limit the successor sovereign’s 
discretion to nationalize or to expropriate property. 
The original position of countries such as the PRC regarding foreign debts 
upon its succession to power appears to have been one of total renunciation.15 
The PRC proclamation issued in 1949 left little doubt that the PRC would never 
feel itself bound by obligations assumed by previous Chinese governments.16 
The revolutionary nature of the PRC government, both in its announced 
policies and in its methods of acquiring power, makes this position unsurprising. 
Moreover, in renouncing the debts of its predecessors, the PRC was merely 
following the example of several other revolutionary regimes that came to 
power in the twentieth century.17 Renunciation was also a practical and 
understandable course for a new government emerging from years of war and 
civil strife with considerable debts and little or no foreign exchange. 
B. Odious Debts 
In justifying its position once the Jackson suit began, however, the PRC 
came to rely on the additional argument that the Huguang bonds were “odious 
debts” that the PRC was not obligated to repay.18  In several leading articles in 
the Chinese press, various commentators19 took considerable pains to explain 
 
other State, and the fact that the rights have come into existence under its predecessor is 
immaterial. 
Id. 
 15. Cf. COMMON PROGRAM OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE 
CONFERENCE art. 3, translated in ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF 
COMMUNIST CHINA 36 (1962) [hereinafter Common Program] (“The People’s Republic of China must 
abolish all the prerogatives of imperialist countries in China. It must confiscate bureaucratic capital and 
put it into the possession of the people’s state.”). See also JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, 1 
PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 681–82 (1974). 
 16. Common Program, supra note 15. See also JEROME COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S 
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 681–82 (1974). 
 17. Successor regimes that have renounced the debts of their predecessors include those in the 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and East Germany. For a discussion of renunciation of predecessor debts see 
O’CONNELL, supra note 7, at 19–21. 
 18. See Aide Memoire, supra note 10, at B-2, para. 2. The Chinese analysis of “odious debts” is 
drawn from various sources discussed in the commentaries listed infra note 17. See also WHITEMAN, 
supra note 7, at 860–61. 
 19. See Fu Zhu, The U.S. Court’s Trial of and Judgment on “The Case of Huguang Railway Bearer 
Bonds” Are a Gross Violation of International Law, RENMIN RIBAO, Feb. 25, 1983, at 7, translated in 
FBIS DAILY REPORT: CHINA, FBIS-CHI-83-040, Feb. 28, 1983, B-2, at B-6 [hereinafter U.S. Court’s 
Trial]. 
From the angle of international law, the PRC, as an entity of international law, is the 
continuation of the old China before liberation. However, the birth of New China came after 
the Chinese people overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism 
through protracted, hard armed struggle and won the great victory of the new democratic 
revolution. China has undergone radical changes in its social system to make it a new-type 
socialist state. The old government that oppressed and exploited the Chinese people in the 
past has been replaced by the new government, which represents the interests of all the people 
of all China. Therefore, the new Chinese government naturally disavows all unequal treaties 
imposed on China in the past by the imperialists and all international obligations incompatible 
with the new regime. This is not unprecedented in the history of international relations. For 
example, after the October Revolution in Russia, the Soviet Government of Workers and 
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how the principle of “odious debts” provided a generally acceptable rationale at 
international law for renouncing these types of obligations. The Huguang bonds 
were also analogized to the “unequal treaties”20 imposed on the Qing dynasty 
government by a number of foreign powers, against which both the Chinese 
Republic and the PRC have bitterly complained.21 Consistent with its steadfast 
argument in international fora that it has a right under international law to 
abrogate unilaterally “unequal treaties” concluded by predecessor Chinese 
governments, the PRC has more recently argued that the odious nature of the 
debt incurred by the Qing government to finance the Huguang railway 
permitted renunciation.22  Although neither position has received the general 
international acceptance which the PRC claims, the PRC’s continued insistence 
on its position has probably given both positions greater currency than they 
might otherwise command. 
The PRC also argued strongly that considerations of fairness and equity 
should foreclose any attempts to recover amounts lent under the scheme to 
finance the construction of the Huguang railway.23 Arguing that rapacious 
foreign powers eager to carve out spheres of influence in Qing China foisted the 
railway project and the loans to underwrite the contracts upon a weak, corrupt 
 
Peasants issued a decree on January 1918 abrogating all national debts. Provision No. 1 says: 
“All national debts borne by the previous landlord and bourgeois governments as listed in the 
special notice have been abolished as from 10 December 1917.”  Provision No. 3 of the decree 
stipulates: “All external debts should be unreservedly abolished, without any exception.”  
(“Selected Documents of Reference for International Law,” Chinese edition, 1956, p. 80). 
When disavowing all external debts of the Tsarist government in 1921, (Chichilin) [qi qielin 
7871 0434 2651], members of the Russian People’s Commission for Foreign Affairs, 
proclaimed: “People of no country should be responsible for repaying the debts imposed on 
them like shackles in past centuries.” 
Not inheriting “bad debts” has been a well-established principle in international law. The so-
called “bad debts” include debts incurred by one country borrowing from another country out 
of the need to suppress its own people at home or people in its colonies. 
Id. See also Shih Chun-yu, Idiotic U.S. Court Judgment, TA KUNG PAO, Feb. 10, 1983, at 2, translated in 
FBIS DAILY REPORT: CHINA, FBIS-CHI-83-033, Feb. 16, 1983, W-9, at W-10 (citing U.S. court 
judgment as absurd); Lan Mingliang, Sovereign Immunity Is an Important Principle of International 
Law—Commenting on the Statement Released by the U.S. State Department on the So-Called Huguang 
Railway Bearer Bonds, GUANGMING RIBAO, Feb. 26, 1983, at 3, translated in FBIS DAILY REPORT: 
CHINA, FBIS-CHI-83-050, Mar. 14, 1983, B-3, at B-6 [hereinafter Sovereign Immunity]; Liu Dagun, The 
Odious Nature of the Huguang Railway Loan, RENMIN RIBAO, Sept. 13, 1983, at 7 (excerpts of an 
article to be published in 1983 GUOJIWENTI YANJIU, No. 4), translated in FBIS DAILY REPORT: 
CHINA, FBIS-CHI-83-179, Sept. 14, 1983, B-1 [hereinafter Odious Nature]. 
 20. The distinction between equal and unequal originally is made by HUGO GROTIUS, 3 DE JURE 
BELLA AC PACIS (ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE) 394 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1964). The 
similarities between “odious debts” and “unequal treaties” are explored in U.S. Court’s Trial, supra 
note 19, at B-6, and in Jin Shixuan & Xu Wenshu, The 1911 Huguang Railroad Loan and Its Rejection 
by the Chinese People Fighting for Railroad Protection, RENMIN RIBAO, Mar. 12, 1983, at 7 (originally 
published in RENMIN TIEDAO (PEOPLE’S RAILROAD), Mar. 9, 1983), translated in FBIS DAILY 
REPORT: CHINA, FBIS-CHI-83-052, Mar. 16, 183, B-1 [hereinafter Railroad Loan]. See also Odious 
Nature, supra note 19, at B-4. 
 21. See Hungdah Chiu, Comparison of Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal 
Treaties, in CHINA’S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (Jerome A. Cohen ed., 1972). 
 22. U.S. Court’s Trial, supra note 19, at B-7, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 19, at B-5, B-6. 
 23. U.S. Court’s Trial, supra note 19, at B-7; Railroad Loan, supra note 20. 
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government,24 the PRC government appealed to history for vindication of its 
stance in Jackson. 
Generally, most commentators would agree that extraordinary pressures 
were brought to bear on the Imperial Chinese Government by the foreign 
powers in the late Qing period.25 Even with respect to foreign lending, a number 
of studies have documented the struggle of each nation’s bankers to keep 
portions of the Chinese borrowing from that country’s banks, as well as the 
dominance of various nations over certain railroads or sections of railway lines 
in China.26  Nevertheless, the high degree of foreign involvement in the railway 
construction and lending during the late Qing period does not, in itself, prove 
the PRC’s contention that the Huguang bonds were not just debts.27 
An additional factor in the PRC’s insistence that it would not honor the 
Huguang bonds is the history of popular opposition to foreign loans for railway 
construction in general, and the outcry that greeted these bonds in particular.28  
In the early 1900s, a fairly widespread Chinese popular movement emerged that 
 
 24. Railroad Loan, supra note 20, at B-1. 
The loan was a foreign debt contracted by the Qing government on the eve of its collapse, or 
on 20 May 1911, with a banking syndicate of the four countries of Britain, France, Germany 
and the United States in the name of building the Huguang railroad, but actually was a last-
ditch struggle to maintain its reactionary rule. It was also a product of an act of collusion 
between international imperialism and the Qing government and an intensified effort to 
oppress and exploit Chinese people. 
Id. See also Odious Nature, supra note 17, at B-3, B-4. 
 25. O. EDMUND CLUBB, TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA 39 (1978); JOHN G. REID, THE MANCHU 
ABDICATION AND THE POWERS, 1908–1912 34 (1935). 
 26. See, e.g., CHI-KEUNG LEUNG, CHINA: RAILWAY PATTERNS AND NATIONAL GOALS 26–35 
(1980) (discussing the role of international politics in China’s railway development and the foreign 
“scramble for concessions”); Joseph Cheng, Chinese Law in Transition: The Late Ch’ing Law Reform, 
1901–1911 20–22 (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University) (discussing Chinese 
attempts at self-strengthening to oppose foreign railway-building concessions). But cf. RALPH W. 
HUENEMANN, THE DRAGON AND THE IRON HORSE (1984) (providing an economic history of railroad 
construction in China from 1876 through 1937, which concludes that there are no grounds for Leninist 
charges of exploitation by foreign railroad companies). 
 27. Without further evidence, which would have to be evinced by the PRC government, it is 
impossible to determine whether the terms of the Huguang bonds (interest rate, discount or premium, 
use of proceeds) were fair. In any number of developing countries, both earlier in this century and at 
present, developed countries have lent their capital for use in construction projects undertaken by less-
developed countries. These loans are generally acknowledged to be legal debts of the borrowing 
countries that must be repaid according to their terms, even when borrowers subsequently suffer 
financial or political difficulties. But see Odious Nature, supra note 19, at B-4–B-6 (arguing that the 
terms of the loan were unfair and unilaterally disadvantaged China). 
 28. U.S. Court’s Trial, supra note 19, at B-7 (“[T]he government of New China cannot repay such 
debts as the bonds issued by the Qing government for the building of the Huguang railways, because 
recognizing and repaying this kind of debt would mean denying the ongoing revolutionary struggles 
waged by the Chinese people in the past 100 years or more since the Opium Wars.”); Railroad Loan, 
supra note 20, at B-3, B-4; Odious Nature, supra note 19, at B-6. 
The Huguang Railway Loan agreement severely violated China’s sovereignty and the people’s 
fundamental interests. The Chinese people started their struggle to cancel the contract and to 
turn down the loan as soon as planning of the loan scheme began. This mighty anti-imperialist 
and antifeudalist revolutionary struggle was turned into an armed uprising soon after the 
contract was signed and became an incident that touched off the downfall of the reactionary 
Qing government. 
Odious Nature, supra note 17, at B-6. 
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opposed foreign construction and control of China’s railways. The movement 
generated discontent among the Chinese populace, a discontent that eventually 
burst forth in numerous uprisings against the Qing government. Ultimately, the 
opposition culminated in sustained attempts to topple the Qing government, 
climaxing in an event in the city of Wuhan in Hubei province (northern 
terminus of the Huguang railway), which was generally considered to have 
begun the 1911 revolution ending imperial dynastic rule in China.29 These 
historic instances of opposition to the imperial government remain important 
milestones of the revolution in the PRC political history of today. Thus, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for the PRC government to rationalize 
honoring the Huguang bonds in the light of their significance in Chinese 
revolutionary history.30 Accordingly, the PRC attempted to invoke the 
nationalistic opposition of the period when the Huguang bonds were issued to 
buttress the PRC’s renunciation of them. 
C. Balancing Considerations 
The appeal to concepts of fairness, however, does not necessarily support 
the PRC’s claims. Modern notions of state succession, centered on a balancing 
of competing interests,31 first examine where benefits have been received and 
where burdens have been imposed in assigning responsibility for claims such as 
those over the Huguang bonds. Even conceding the PRC’s claims about the 
foreign machinations surrounding the funding of the Huguang Railway 
construction, the railway was nonetheless built using foreign funds raised by the 
bonds. Moreover, for a considerable period of time thereafter (indeed, right up 
to the present day), China indisputably derived benefits from the Huguang 
Railway.32 The extent of these benefits must be evaluated before the PRC could 
 
 29. EDWARD RHOADS, CHINA’S REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION: THE CASE OF KWANGTUNG, 1895–
1913 207–10 (1975); SICHUAN PROVINCIAL ARCHIVES (SICHUAN SHENG DANG’AN GUAN), SICHUAN 
BAOLU YUNDONG DANG’AN XUANBIAN (1981) [Selected Documents of the Railway Protection 
Movement in Sichuan], XINHAI NIAN SICHUAN BAOLU YUNDONG SHILIAO HUIBIAN (1981) 
[Collection of Historical Materials on the Railway Protection Movement in Sichuan in 1911]. See also 
CLUBB, supra note 25, at 39; JOHN FAIRBANK ET AL., EAST ASIA: THE MODERN TRANSFORMATION 
629–31 (1965). 
 30. Odious Nature, supra note 19, at B-7. 
The acknowledgement of the Huguang Railway bonds is by no means an issue simply 
concerning old debts but is a fundamental problem concerning our effort to safeguard the fruit 
of the revolution for which the Chinese people have unremittingly fought at the cost of blood 
for more than 100 years. The just stand of the Chinese Government toward the Huguang 
Railway bonds case conforms to the will of the 1 billion Chinese people. Adhering to this 
stand, the Chinese Government has safeguarded the dignity of the PRC and has won the 
strong support of the Chinese people of all nationalities and the sympathy of Third World 
countries. 
Id. 
 31. See, e.g., James L. Foorman & Michael E. Jehle, Effects of State and Government Succession on 
Commercial Bank Loans to Foreign Sovereign Borrowers, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 12–14 (1982) (brief 
review of modern theories of state succession). See also FEILCHENFELD, supra note 6, at 387–89, 546–
70; O’CONNELL, supra note 7, at 436; WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 95–96. 
 32. See LEUNG, supra note 26, at 72–81; Zen Sun, The Pattern of Railway Development in China, 
14 FAR E. Q. 161, 179–99 (1955). But see Odious Nature, supra note 19, at B-2: 
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deny any obligation for repayment of the Huguang bonds. In addition, the 
PRC’s denial of liability for the Huguang bonds ignores the fact that the regime 
which succeeded to the Imperial Chinese Government following the Revolution 
of 1911 felt obliged to continue repayment of the bonds, despite their role in the 
revolution. It may be argued convincingly that the Republican government 
recognized the usefulness of the railway and its benefits to national 
development, notwithstanding the controversy its financing engendered.33 
The burden–benefit analysis of modern notions of state succession also 
seems to undercut the suggestions of several observers that the government of 
the Republic of China, still in power on the island of Taiwan and recognized by 
the United States as the government of all China after 1948 until normalization 
of relations with the PRC, should arguably have assumed the obligation to 
repay the Huguang bonds. First, the Taiwan government had no use of the 
benefit because it no longer controlled the Huguang Railway.34 All the assets of 
the railway remained in place on the mainland after the Republic of China 
government fled to Taiwan. Second, this lack of benefit outweighs the fact that 
the Taiwan government remained the U.S.-recognized government of China 
and is still the same government, using the title “Republic of China,” that 
promised several times to remedy its defaults on the obligations at the earliest 
opportunity.35 Whatever the government’s historical responsibility was to 
Taiwan for honoring the Huguang bonds, its flight to Taiwan certainly 
diminished the obligation it had earlier assumed. 
In summary, international law adopts neither the U.S. nor the PRC views 
concerning the ability of states to renounce the obligations of their predecessors 
under international law, but rather has sought in recent times to minimize the 
disruption of vested rights having a legitimate expectation of being honored. 
The PRC’s formulation of a rule at international law that “odious debts” may 
be repudiated has not found favor outside what remains of the socialist world 
today and in a few other past instances. Yet even were the rule advanced by the 
PRC to be adopted, it is rather unlikely that the Huguang bonds are the sort of 
debt which should be characterized as “odious,” especially when the role of the 
railway that they were used to finance is considered objectively in its historical 
 
Take, for example, the Huguang Railway bonds held in the hands of the American bearers: 
[a]ccording to the contract, this railway should be “finished in approximately 3 years,” and the 
American loans should be used in building the railway from Yichang in Hubei to Kuizhou 
(now called Fengjie) [in Sichuan province]. However, nearly 40 years passed before liberation 
and there was still no railway between the two cities. 
Id. 
 33. Despite Sun Yatsen’s announced opposition to the railway loans from foreign powers at the 
time they were made, before the 1911 revolution, the necessity of using foreign capital for expansion of 
China’s railways after the establishment of the Republic of China became obvious. See LEUNG, supra 
note 26, at 51–53. 
 34. The government of the Republic of China fled to Taiwan in 1949; on September 29, 1949, the 
PRC government took responsibility for railroads on the mainland by virtue of Article 36 of the 
COMMON PROGRAM OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE, translated 
in BLAUSTEIN, supra note 16, at 47–48. 
 35. Jackson, supra note 2, at 872 (also citing Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 6 in Jackson). 
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context. On the other hand, the political imperative for such characterization is 
quite obvious. 
III 
THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE WITH RESPECT TO  
LENDING OF THE 1970S AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY36 
Some experts such as Bryan Thomas trace the bulk of the debt crisis 
currently facing much of the developing world “to a period of intense, 
indiscriminate lending by private commercial banks and International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) which began in the in early 1970s.”37 Though Thomas notes 
disagreement over the root causes of the 1970s lending frenzy . . . , commentators 
across the political spectrum agree that there was a lending frenzy, primarily on the 
part of private banks, which took place roughly between 1971 and 1982 (when crisis 
finally struck). . . . In recent years, officials with the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have been [surprisingly] candid about the failings of their 
respective institutions throughout this period.38 
The gist of Thomas’s thesis is that “there is a long history of sovereign-debt 
crises, which to a limited extent resemble the most recent [one and which] 
speak[] to the need for innovation.”39 
 
Thomas notes what he regards as a depressing but “recurring pattern”: 
sovereigns borrow more than they can afford to repay, . . . consequently borrow[ing] 
more to service the initial debt, and before long the situation spirals into a full-blown 
debt crisis. Lenders and borrowers learn their lesson, for a time, but collective 
memory ultimately erodes, and the cycle is repeated. . . .  When the stakes are high, 
both creditor and debtor have an interest in finding manageable solutions, or at least 
workable stop-gap measures. Debtors struggle to service debts, at least minimally, so 
that they are not shut off from further lending; creditors offer further loans so that 
debtors are not driven into complete bankruptcy.40 
A. What Led to the Debt Crisis of the 1970s 
As far back as the debts incurred to finance the disastrous Spanish Armada 
in the 1580s, there have been cycles of excessive lending which lead to debt 
crises, refinancing through downward spirals, and firm resolve never to sin 
again. During the nineteenth century, the Bank of England intervened to 
 
 36. As originally published, section III of this article borrowed several passages, without signaling 
proper attribution, from Bryan Thomas, The Doctrine of Odious Debts and Lending of the Seventies: 
Assessing the Options 86-106 (CISCL Working Paper: Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine, Feb. 
2002). This revision remedies these errors. James V. Feinerman 
 37. Bryan Thomas, The Doctrine of Odious Debts and Lending of the Seventies: Assessing the 
Options 86 (CISCL Working Paper: Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine, Feb. 2002), available at 
http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/debtentire.pdf. 
 38. See, e.g., P. MOSELEY, J. HARRIGAN & J. TOYE, CONDITIONALITY AS BARGAINING PROCESS 
in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT 
TRANSACTIONS 117–26 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 3d ed. 1994). 
 39. Thomas, supra note 37, at 86. 
 40. Id. 
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prevent famous merchant bankers from descending into bankruptcy. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the Great Depression brought another debt 
crisis to Latin America, which took decades to conclude.41 “What distinguishes 
earlier lending from the lending of the 1970s, among other things,” with 
particular implications for the doctrine of odious debts 
is . . . that loans of previous eras came in the form of bonds, supplier credits, and direct 
investment. In the 1970s, by contrast, loans were arranged primarily between private 
commercial banks and the national governments of developing countries. In assessing 
the viability of applying the odious debt doctrine to loans of the 1970s, this distinction 
is crucial. Bondholders of earlier eras were too far removed from the end uses of their 
lending for the courts to establish . . . subjective awareness of odious use (recall, 
subjective awareness of odious use, on the part of creditors, is a primary criterion in 
applying the odious debt doctrine). In the words of one commentator, “[B]anks [in the 
1970s] had branches or representative offices in the debtor countries and they were 
thus in a position to assess first-hand the local political and economic scene. A similar 
presumption cannot be made about bondholders.”42 
In the early 1970s, many developing countries were experiencing rapid 
economic growth: 
Brazil’s economy, for example, grew, on average, by 11 percent annually between 1968 
and 1971; in 1970, Mexico had thirty years of solid economic growth behind it (6 
percent per annum, on average). There was therefore a widespread expectation that 
the successes of the Asian “tigers” would be replicated in these and other Latin 
American countries. [Obviously,] [t]hese high hopes never came to fruition. Indeed, it 
was obvious (to some) by the mid-1970s that the debt load of developing countries was 
unsustainable. As it became obvious in the late 1970s that debts loads were 
unsustainable, lending to developing countries promptly dried up.43 
The rise of syndicated lending in the late 1960s allowed banks [—major U.S. banks: 
Citicorp, Chase Manhattan, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, and Manufacturers 
Hanover—] to negotiate much larger loans; . . . the [lead] bank in a lending syndicate 
collected an array of fees from other participants, creating an incentive for what has 
since been called “loan pushing.” 
In the parlance of a UN study, the major “leader banks” (listed above) aggressively 
marketed loans to developing countries, particularly Latin American states, 
throughout the 1970s, prompting “challenger” banks of Europe, Canada, and Japan to 
enter the market. Smaller banks, dubbed “followers,” eventually got in on the 
action . . . .44 
 
 
 41. ROSS P. BUCKLEY, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECONDARY 
MARKET 8 (1999). 
 42. Thomas, supra note 37, at 87 (quoting Lee Buchheit, The New Latin American Debt Regime—
Cross-Border Lending: What’s Different This Time?, 16 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 44, 48 (1995)). 
 43. Thomas, supra note 37, at 88 (citing BUCKLEY, supra note 40, at 16, 9). For the growth of 
Brazilian and Mexican economies in this period, see generally William Easterly et al., Good Policy or 
Good Luck? Country Growth Performance and Temporary Shocks (NBER Working Paper No. W4474, 
Sept. 1993), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=260539. 
 44. Thomas, supra note 37, at  89 (citing ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN, TRANSNATIONAL BANK BEHAVIOUR AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS, 
ESTUDIOS E INFORMES DE LA CEPAL SERIES, No. 76 (LC/G.1553/Rev.1-P, Santiago, Chile, 1989) 
(quoted in BUCKLEY, supra note 41, at 9); WILLIAM A. DARITY & BOBBIE L. HORN, THE LOAN 
PUSHERS: THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 65 (1988). 
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The debts of the 1970s were incurred as an indirect result of the oil crises of 
that decade. Higher oil prices put cash in the hands of wealthy Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations, who in turn deposited 
these funds in commercial bank accounts. Commercial banks from global 
money centers were “eager” to make loans with this money, but due to the 
recession induced by the oil crises, found few interested borrowers in the 
developed world.45 They “turned to the developing world in search of 
borrowers, [who] seemed a reasonable credit risk” due to the steady rise in 
prices of raw materials—their main exports.46 The commodity price boom of the 
early 1970s is seen by some as an even bigger reason for the explosive growth in 
bank lending than the surge in oil prices.47 Moreover, many developing 
countries were experiencing rapid economic growth during the 1970s, especially 
Brazil and Mexico, Latin America’s two largest countries. Many expected the 
region to copy the experience of the Asian “tigers,” hopes which were not 
subsequently realized. 
Recession in the developed world, the soaring value of the U.S. dollar 
relative to Latin American currencies, and plunging prices of many 
commodities exported by developing countries in the 1980 brought this period 
to a calamitous close.48 Although bankers of that era may have been careless or 
profligate in their loan-making, such carelessness and profligacy on the part of 
creditors is not grounds for debt cancellation under the doctrine of odious 
debts. That doctrine requires that creditors have been subjectively aware of the 
odious purpose of the loan.49 
As Thomas notes, economists Darity and Horn reach the conclusion that, 
even if bad loans were good business for major banks in the 1970s, this would 
not necessarily make these loans “odious.” 
They write . . . [,] “Ironically . . . loan pushing is most consistent, within the context of 
the rational expectations hypothesis, with [the view that] bankers knowingly made bad 
foreign loans.” Darity and Horn claim, among other things[,] that banks received 
substantial up-front fees for arranging loans to developing counties; that major banks 
relied, with good reason, upon IFIs (such as the IMF) as de facto guarantors of their 
loans to developing countries; [and] that due to economies of scale, small banks 
were put at greater risk than large banks by their involvement in lending to 
developing countries, so that at the end of the day, debt crises may actually have 
further strengthened the market dominance of the major banks.50 
Walter Wriston, then Chairman of Citicorp, asserted, “Countries don’t go out 
of business. . . . The infrastructure doesn’t go away, the productivity of the 
people doesn’t go away, the natural resources don’t go away. And so their 
 
 45. Thomas, supra note 37, at 87–88 (citing Alberto. G. Santos, Note, Beyond Baker and Brady: 
Deeper Debt Reduction for Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 72 (1991)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. DARITY & HORN, supra note 44, 15–39 (1988). 
 49. ALEXANDER N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES 
PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIERES 157 (1927). 
 50. Thomas, supra note 37, at 90 (quoting DARITY & HORN, supra note 44, at 138). 
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assets always exceed their liabilities, which is the technical reason for 
bankruptcy. And that’s very different from a company.”51 With such a world 
view, it was no wonder that loan officers were eager to make these large loans 
and that senior bank officials profited from the interest rates, upfront fees, and 
other charges received from Latin American borrowers. 
There is no simple explanation of the lending frenzy that took place in the 1970s. The 
behavior of major lenders throughout this period admits of several explanations. A 
mixture of short-sightedness and greed, combined with layers of principal–agent 
problems combined to produce [this] latest developing country debt crisis. Note that 
these explanations are, for the most part, compatible with the supposition that both 
local bankers and senior bank officers knew what they were getting involved in [as the 
1970s loan crisis fomented]. Local officers went ahead with risky loans because they 
were rewarded for bringing in contracts and seldom punished for defaults. Senior bank 
officers went ahead with risky loans because high interest loans, accompanied by 
substantial front-payments, are impressive on the current balance sheet, which in turn 
drives up the value of a bank’s shares (in the short run, at least).52 
 To be fair, from the perspective of Western banks, many developing 
countries were good loan prospects in the 1970s. Most produced raw materials, 
foodstuffs, or manufactured goods that were in demand, and at record high 
prices. Their growth rates looked even better than those for industrial countries: 
from 1960 to 1980, Latin America’s economic growth rate was nearly twice the 
U.S. rate. Developing countries thought it made sense for them to borrow as 
long as interest rates were low and inflation was high—the loans fueled their 
economies at little cost. With high inflation through most of that decade, by the 
time the dollars had to be repaid, their real value had decreased. Meanwhile, 
the borrowers could invest the money in economic development. And, most 
importantly (at least until the loans became due), it worked. Between 1973 and 
1980, the economies of oil-importing developing countries grew an average of 
4.6%, compared with 2.5% for the industrial world.53 
 Yet, “[b]y 1982, when the debt crisis came to a head, total exposure of U.S. 
banks to developing countries accounted for 287.7% of the banks’ total 
capital.54“ Debt repudiation or a collapse by even a single country could have 
jeopardized the survival of not only many money-center banks, but even the 
financial system as a whole. Fortunately, borrowers did not unilaterally 
repudiate their debts. The main reason may be that they did not want to burn 
any bridges with international lenders. They may also have feared that if they 
invoked the doctrine of odious debts, it would scare away future lenders. As the 
Economist noted in contemplating South Africa’s potential use of the doctrine, 
“[South Africa’s] credit rating would be wrecked as it came to be lumped with 
other deadbeats. Foreign investors would be deterred, and South Africa would 
 
 51. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, MONEY MATTERS: AN IMF EXHIBIT—THE 
IMPORTANCE OF GLOBAL COOPERATION: DEBT AND TRANSITION 1981–1989, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/center/mm/eng/mm_dt_01.htm (last visited June 3, 2009). 
 52. Thomas, supra note 37, at 91. 
 53. Jay Palmer, The Debt-Bomb Threat, TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 1. 
 54. Thomas, supra note 37, at 92 (citing BUCKLEY, supra note 41, at 25); see also Jeffrey Sachs, 
Making the Brady Plan Work, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1989, at 89. 
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have to pay more for future borrowings.”55 “Furthermore, syndicated lending, 
by its legal nature, tends to discourage lenders from suing on their debt. 
Syndicated loans invariably contain contractual provisions [that] require . . . any 
recovery made by any single creditor be shared with all other creditors.”56 
 The perils for countries choosing the course of unilateral debt repudiation is 
illustrated by the difficulties encountered by the Peruvian economy, following 
President Alan Garcia’s decision, in 1984, to repudiate a substantial portion of 
that country’s debt. The jury, however, remains out as to whether Peru’s 
subsequent economic problems resulted from this act (and foreign investors’ 
reactions) or from other causes. As Lothian writes, 
Peru did not experience a sudden shut-down of foreign loans and equity capital 
in response to the infamous ten percent debt moratorium. Furthermore, Peru’s 
trade and short-term credit were not measurably affected by international 
hostility toward the country. Indeed, export credits increased annually each 
year from 1983–1988. Shortfalls in the flow of import credit could be financed, 
at least temporarily, from increased reserves brought about by reduced 
remittances on external debt.57 
Peru experienced serious economic difficulties in the years following, but 
disaster struck the Peruvian economy due to a combination of price controls 
and a radical program of government spending. In the end, Garcia had to 
return—hat in hand—to the IMF, “where he agreed to repay old debts and 
submit Peru to an austerity program.”58 These problems were homegrown, 
however, and not the result of Peru’s repudiation of its foreign debt or of 
retribution by foreign investors. More significantly, Peru’s unilateral 
repudiation was not a cancellation of debt pursuant to the doctrine of odious 
debts. Peru did not claim its debts were odious, but rather unaffordable. 
Obviously, the hope of those who considered invoking the doctrine of 
odious debts in the 1970s and 1980s was that it would encourage lenders to 
consider various factors before making sovereign loans, with the threat that 
future “odious lending” might result in such debts being dishonored. Thus, 
attempts to articulate a modern doctrine was intended to have the positive long-
term effect of discouraging lenders from participating in odious debts. But 
lenders are not cavalier in making loans to sovereign debtors. Major loan 
agreements must first be approved by lawyers on all sides, beginning with a 
due-diligence investigation on the part of the lenders’ counsel. These 
agreements also “require a . . . written ‘opinion of counsel’—both from the 
lender and the borrower’s counsel, and, in the case of foreign borrowers, an 
 
 55. Unforgivable: South Africa’s Apartheid Debts, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999, quoted in Thomas, 
supra note 37, at 92–93. 
 56. Thomas, supra note 37, at 92 (citing R. MacMillan, The New Latin American Debt Regime: 
Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-out System, 16 J. INTL. L. BUS. 57, at 72); see also Keith Clark & 
Martin Hughes, Approaches to the Restructuring of Sovereign Debt, in MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH 
REISNER, SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 131, 136–37 (1984). 
 57. Tamara Lothian, The Criticism of the Third-World Debt and the Revision of Legal Doctrine, 13 
WIS. INT’L L.J. 421, 435 (1995), quoted in Thomas, supra note 37, at 93. 
 58. Thomas, supra note 37, at 93. 
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independent foreign counsel, of the bank’s choosing, before the loan is 
advanced.”59 
B. Difficulties in Applying the Doctrine of Odious Debts to Debts Incurred in 
the 1970s 
As commercial banks exposed themselves to great risk by over-lending to 
developing countries, their overexposure “created, in the early 1980s, a threat 
to the stability of the entire system of international finance. . . . [A]ttempts to 
foreclose on this debt [c]ould [have] . . . spell[ed] disaster[] by triggering 
widespread defaults. [So] [c]ommercial banks were coaxed, in part by the IMF 
and in part by the U.S. government, in the case of US banks, into participating 
in efforts to ‘restructure’ these debts . . . .”60 When debtor countries, such as 
Peru, voluntarily participate in IMF renegotiation of their debts, they appear to 
acknowledge that these debts were legitimate; as a consequence, they may 
subsequently be estopped from arguing that the debts were odious. The Latin 
American debts of the 1970s (like most later debt) were restructured by the 
scheme which became known as the Brady Plan, “rely[ing] on a blend of . . . 
partial debt forgiveness, exten[ded] . . . payment schedules, the conversion of 
private loans into long-maturity bonds, [and debt-for-equity swaps].”61 
A large portion of the 1970s debts of Latin American countries would 
probably be considered non-odious. For example, borrowed capital spent on 
schools, hospitals, and other beneficial projects (or at least not squirreled away 
in Swiss bank accounts for private use) would not be considered odious. 
Restructuring plans lump together all loans, legitimate and illegitimate. 
Furthermore, many of these debts are then converted into bonds, ultimately 
consolidating legitimate and odious debts. Thus, it may be almost impossible to 
separate odious from non-odious debts. So, despite the view of Noam Chomsky 
and some others,62 that all developing-country debt is odious, the combination 
 
 59. Thomas, supra note 37, at 94 (citing Michael Gruson, Legal Aspects of International Lending: 
Basic Concepts of a Loan Agreement, in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND 
STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS 299–300 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 2d ed. 1986)). 
 60. Thomas, supra note 37, at 95. “The U.S. government’s interest in restructuring LDC debt was 
motivated in part by a concern that crippling LDC debts was bad for domestic exporters. . . . Lothian 
writes[,] . . . “Toward the end of the 1980s, the positions of governments and commercial banks 
collided. In the minds of international bureaucrats and policy-makers, two considerations were 
paramount: first, the prospect of deepening recession and policy instability in debtor countries; second, 
the related effects on international economic activity.” Id. at 95, n.46, quoting Lothian, supra note 57, at 
433. 
 61. Id. at 96, (citing Theodore Allegaert, Recalcitrant Creditors Against Debtor Nations, or How to 
Play Darts, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 429, 436 (1997)). 
 62. David Barsamian, Talking ‘Anarchy’ With Noam Chomsky, THE NATION, Apr. 24, 2000, at 29 
available at  http://www.thenation.com/doc/20000424/chomsky (“Debt is not valid if it’s essentially 
imposed by force. The Third World debt is odious debt. That’s even been recognized by the US 
representative at the IMF, Karen Lissaker, an international economist, who pointed out a couple of 
years ago that if we were to apply the principles of odious debt, most of the Third World debt would 
simply disappear.”) (quoting Noam Chomsky). 
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of non-odious and possibly odious debt virtually guarantees that they all will be 
repaid, albeit with negotiated reductions. 
The IMF played an important role in overseeing debt-restructuring plans in 
the mid-1980s through the mechanism of “structural adjustment plans.” From 
the early 1980s on, the IMF took a lead role in supervising restructuring plans, 
offering loans to developing countries so they could meet short-term balance-
of-payment needs, and imposing drastic structural adjustment programs on 
developing countries to assure creditors. The IMF oversaw these plans, insuring 
that debtor nations got their fiscal houses in order and were positioned to repay 
their debts.63 
Although Thomas’s analysis begins “by arguing that 1970s commercial bank 
lending to developing countries was in a sense uniquely amenable to 
cancellation under the doctrine of odious debts[] [because] those lenders, in 
most cases, had more information at their disposal about the end uses of their 
loans than did bondholders of previous eras,”64 he ends by acknowledging that 
odious debt doctrine contributed little to the solution of the debt repayment 
crisis in Latin America of the 1970s. Perhaps the biggest difficulty in applying 
the doctrine of odious debt during that era was establishing creditors’ subjective 
awareness of “odiousness.” In Thomas’s view, “[the] restructuring plans had the 
effect of rolling odious debts together with non-odious debts, and subsequent 
trading on secondary markets immensely complicated the task of sorting them 
out again.”65 
To the extent that IFIs played a part in creating the 1970s debt crisis, 
developing countries—”in their efforts to have debts cancelled under the 
doctrine of odious debts”—may have been “required to demonstrate that IFIs 
[undertook] loan agreements despite subjective awareness, on the part of their 
agents, that the loans were likely to be used for corrupt or tyrannical 
purposes. . . . [There is] considerable evidence to suggest that agents of these 
IFIs have indeed turned a blind eye to corruption, and as a result may have 
contracted odious debts.”66 
World Bank lending was in many important ways unlike the laissez faire 
policies of commercial banks in the 1970s. With World Bank loans, projects 
were monitored through to completion. But this does not result in the 
conclusion that some International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and International Debt Association (IDA) loans of the 1970s were in 
part odious. In recent years, the World Bank has been surprisingly candid about 
its failings throughout this period, effectively confessing to willful blindness in 
 
 63. INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT 
TRANSACTIONS 147–230 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 3d ed. 1994). 
 64. Thomas, supra note 37, at 99. 
 65. Id. at 100. 
 66. Id., citing Ana Isabel Eiras, The Senate’s Blank Check to International Financial Institutions, 
HERITAGE FOUND. REPS. No. 1928, Apr. 17, 2006, at 3–4. 
FEINERMAN FINAL_FIXED.DOC 11/8/2010  3:09:38 PM 
Autumn 2007] ODIOUS DEBT, OLD AND NEW 209 
the face of corruption on the part of developing country borrowers.67 “To ‘deal 
with the cancer of corruption,’ the World Bank created an Anti-Corruption 
Task Force charged with the task of revising World Bank protocol to combat 
corruption.”68 
. . . World Bank loans . . . might offer some of the best test cases for innovative uses of 
the doctrine of odious debt. First, the extensive involvement of World Bank loan 
officers throughout projects will make subjective awareness . . . relatively easy to 
establish. Second[], recent statements by World Bank officials amount, essentially, to 
confessions of the prior involvement of these organizations in odious lending. Third, 
World Bank debts have not been sold on secondary markets, nor have they been 
restructured in the way that private commercial debt has been. . . . And finally, World 
Bank loan contracts, as explained above, are subject to arbitration tribunals. [This 
forum] may be more willing to entertain a principle of international law such as the 
doctrine of odious debts.”69 
 
IMF loans, on the other hand, will not likely qualify for cancellation under 
the doctrine of odious debt. 
 
[T]he IMF always imposes conditions upon its loans, and corrupt governments of the 
1970s preferred to contract unconditional loans from private creditors. . . . 
Furthermore, the IMF has a purely macroeconomic mandate: its role is not to fund 
projects, or even to gather information on the political economic activities of its 
members. . . . .70 [M]uch of the developing-country debt held by the IMF is from the 
period of restructuring that came after the 1970s debt crisis; . . . it seems untenable to 
suppose that loans intended . . . to avert default and aid in balance-of-payment 
problems are odious.71 
IV 
ODIOUS RULERS, ODIOUS DEBTS— 
ODIOUS DEBTS IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND 
In an article in the Atlantic Monthly,72 Joseph Stiglitz noted, 
At the end of World War I, John Maynard Keynes, later to become the founder of 
modern macroeconomics, returned from the Versailles Treaty negotiations 
 
 67. Former World Bank staff member James Wesberry wrote, “From the end of World War II to 
almost the end of this century, IFIs maintained a ‘three-monkey policy’ toward corruption—they did 
not see it, they did not hear of it, and they never, never spoke of it—except perhaps in hushed words 
like ‘rent-seeking.’” James Wesberry, International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption Eruption: 
If the IFIs Put Their Muscle and Money Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption Eruption May Be 
Capped, 18 NW. J. INTL. L. & BUS. 498, 499 (1998), quoted in Thomas, supra note 37, at 102. 
 68. Thomas, supra note 37, at 102 (citing J. Wesberry, supra note 67, at 499 (quoting President of 
the World Bank James Wolfensohn)); see also John Brademas & Fritz Heimann, Tackling International 
Corruption: No Longer Taboo, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 17. 
 69. Thomas, supra note 37, at 104; see also SEAMUS O’CLEIREACAIN, THIRD WORLD DEBT AND 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY 109 (1990). 
 70. “The IMF’s Managing Director, Michael Camdessus, explained in 1998 that ‘[the IMF] has a 
macroeconomic mission, and our mandate is restricted to those specific instances of corruption that 
may have a significant—some would say demonstrable—macroeconomic impact.’” Thomas, supra note 
37, at 104, n.79, (quoting Wesberry, supra note 67, at 517). 
 71. Id. at 104. 
 72. Joseph Stiglitz, Odious Rules, Odious Debts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2003, at 39. 
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disappointed by the outcome and wrote a forceful little book, The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace. Its message was simple: the burden of reparations 
imposed on Germany would lead to economic crisis and social and political turmoil—
and the result would not be good for Europe. Keynes turned out to be right. Today, 
after a decade of isolation and a devastating war, Iraq faces the daunting task of 
reconstructing its economy while moving from a form of ersatz socialism to market 
capitalism. 
Stiglitz went on to note that the problem for Iraq today is debt—totaling 
anywhere from $60 billion to the hundreds of billions—including reparations 
imposed on the country after the 1991 Gulf War, earlier debts from ammunition 
purchases, and obligations assumed under contracts signed during Saddam 
Hussein’s regime. Once the oil starts to flow again, much of the revenue 
generated would go directly into the hands of international creditors, to the 
detriment of reconstruction efforts. Stiglitz argues that the country needs a 
respite from what others have called its “odious debts”—debts incurred by a 
regime without political legitimacy, from creditors who should have known 
better, with the monies often spent to oppress the very people who are then 
asked to repay the debts. As he notes with a jabbing sense of irony, “Most of 
Iraq’s current debt was incurred by a ruthless and corrupt government long 
recognized as such—although complicating the matter is the fact that the Iraqi 
regime appears to have received some support from the United States under 
Ronald Reagan.”73 
Yet Stiglitz noted that international agreement on the matter of debt relief 
would be no easier to come by than on the need to invade Iraq. And as he went 
on to observe, Iraq is not the only country needing debt forgiveness. In the 
queue are the Congolese, who would otherwise be forced to repay loans made 
to Mobutu that went to his Swiss bank accounts; Ethiopia, whose people would 
have to repay the loans made to the Mengistu “Red Terror” regime; Chileans 
still paying off debts incurred during the Pinochet years; South Africans with 
debts incurred under apartheid; and Argentines who can ill afford repayment of 
the money that financed the “dirty war” in their country from 1976 to 1983.74 
The problem, as Stiglitz readily noted, is basically one of legal infrastructure: 
 
Regrettably, we have no rule of law at the international level for the restructuring of 
government debts. In the past, Western governments had an easy way of dealing with 
countries that didn’t meet their financial obligations: they invaded them. Today we 
live in what we hope is a more civilized world: we no longer openly condone armed 
attacks by one country on another for a failure to pay up. At the level of personal debt 
we’ve made progress, by instituting bankruptcy laws to replace debtors’ prisons, 
portrayed so graphically in the work of Charles Dickens. And yet to date we have no 
parallel set of laws governing the restructuring and relief of international debt. Two 
years ago the International Monetary Fund at last recognized that this is a major 
problem and proposed a set of guiding principles. Achieving international consensus 
on these principles would have been difficult (the IMF was insisting, problematically, 
that it serve as the bankruptcy judge, or play some other central role in the bankruptcy 
process, despite the fact that it is one of the international community’s major 
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 74. Id. at 42. 
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creditors), but the United States pronounced the initiative unnecessary, effectively 
blocking it altogether.75 
Stiglitz also remarked upon the “heads we win, tails you lose” nature of 
United States moves for debt forgiveness and repayment. When other countries 
are the creditors, we counsel debt forgiveness; when our own money is at stake, 
we fall back on arguments for the sanctity of contract, regardless of the political 
circumstances. When Indonesia’s Suharto was overthrown in 1998, the Clinton 
Administration was adamant that Indonesia honor the contracts the U.S. 
government had encouraged the country to enter into.76 When India threatened 
to abrogate energy contracts with the infamous Enron corporation (which 
forced it to pay outrageous prices for electricity), top officials in the Bush 
Administration insisted that those contracts be honored. 
Looking back on the experience of the 1970s and 1980s, Stiglitz drew some 
significant conclusions with implications for the current Iraqi debt: 
We must now recognize that debt forgiveness and debt restructuring make as much 
sense for governments—benefiting debtors and creditors alike—as they do for 
companies and individuals. Absolutely nobody gained from the over-hang of debt in 
Latin America in the 1980s, a decade during which growth in the region stalled and 
poverty increased enormously. Creditors certainly didn’t get their money back, and it 
was only with the implementation of the long-delayed Brady plan of debt 
restructuring, set in motion by U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady in 1989, that 
growth resumed.77 
Others have echoed Stiglitz’s concerns. In an article in the Financial Times, 
Harold James noted that the current situation in Iraq eerily recalls the 
circumstances following the Allied victory after the first World War. Most 
importantly, the idealism of Woodrow Wilson and the new peaceful world 
order he sought to install failed because 
[t]he second threat to Wilsonianism arose out of the financial legacy of the first world 
war. A debate about the distribution of war debts and reparations paralysed the 
international financial system and eventually contributed significantly to the financial 
meltdown of the Great Depression. Reparations looked like an impossible burden, in 
which a moral and political claim threatened the ability of the debtors—especially 
Germany—to service normal public and commercial debt.78 
James argued that it would be a mistake to apply what he terms “financial 
Wilsonianism”; introducing high-risk premiums and making international 
lending significantly more precarious would not insure the end of odious debt. 
Rather, he suggests that—as was the case with the reparations and war debts in 
the 1920s, which also had a basis in morality—Wilsonianism applied to the debt 
of dictators would produce new uncertainties and a new threat to the entire 
international financial system.79 So what was to be done? 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 45. 
 78. Harold James, The Danger of Being Too Forgiving, FIN. TIMES, May 1, 2003, at 19. 
 79. Id. 
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Ultimately, as least for the Iraqi debt incurred by Saddam Hussein, the 
nineteen member nations of the Paris Club80 agreed to forgive eighty percent of 
Iraq’s debt. The plan reduced Iraq’s total debt owed to the member nations to 
$7.8 billion, from the original $38.9 billion, over a period of four years.81  The 
three-phase plan approved by the creditors called for an immediate cancellation 
of thirty percent of Iraq’s current debt, which was to be followed by another 
thirty percent in 2005 upon approval of an economic program for the nation by 
the International Monetary Fund, and an additional twenty percent in 2008 
after an evaluation of the effectiveness of the program.82 Adel Abdul Mahdi, 
Iraq’s Finance Minister, said that the deal was “historic.”83 He also expressed 
optimism that other creditor nations, including neighbors in the Middle East as 
well as several Eastern European nations, would follow the West’s lead in 
forgiving Iraqi debt.84 For purposes of this arrangement, however, Iraq’s non-
odious and possibly odious debts were lumped together; no accommodation was 
made in the forgiven portion to separate the types of debt. 
V 
JUBILEE 2000 PROPOSAL 
The Jubilee 200085 Charter proposed that due to the overwhelming need for 
remission of the backlog of unpayable debts owed by highly indebted poor 
countries, there should be a complete forgiveness of the debts owed by those 
countries. Debt remission would have related to commercial, government, and 
IMF–World Bank debts, and debt reduction would have comprehensively 
included all three forms of debt. In the view of the proponents of Jubilee 2000, 
 
 80. The Paris Club is an informal group of financial officials from nineteen of the world’s richest 
countries, which provides financial services such as debt restructuring, debt relief, and debt cancellation 
to indebted countries and their creditors. Debtors are often recommended by the IMF after alternative 
solutions have failed. It meets every six weeks at the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and 
Industry in Paris. It is chaired by a senior official of the French Treasury. The club grew out of crisis 
talks held in Paris in 1956 between the nation of Argentina and its various creditors. Its principles and 
procedures were codified at the end of the 1970s. 
 81. Paul Carrell & Glenn Somerville, Paris Club Drops 80 Pct of Iraq Debt it Owed, REUTERS, 
Nov. 21, 2004. 
 82. See Press Release, Paris Club, Iraq: The Paris Club And The Republic Of Iraq Agree On Debt 
Relief (Nov. 21, 2004), available at http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/services/communiques/irak6017/ 
switchLanguage/en (last visited Sept. 5, 2007). 
 83. John Leicester, Group Agrees to Reduce Iraqi Debt, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2004, at A14. 
 84. See the Paris Club’s website for full details of the Iraqi debt deal and its current status at 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/traitements/irak-20041121/viewLanguage/en (last visited Oct. 25, 
2007). 
 85. Jubilee 2000 was an international coalition movement in over forty countries calling for 
cancellation of unpayable third world debt by the year 2000. This movement coincided with the Great 
Jubilee, the celebration of the year 2000 in Christian churches. 
In the Jubilee Year, as quoted in the Old Testament, those enslaved because of debts are freed, lands 
lost because of debt are returned, and a community separated by economic inequality is restored. 
“Consecrate the fiftieth year and proclaim liberty throughout the land to all its inhabitants. It shall be a 
jubilee for you; each one of you is to return to his family property and each to his own clan.” Leviticus 
25:10 (New International Version). 
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creditors as well as debtors must accept responsibility for these high levels of 
indebtedness. 
The Jubilee 2000 Charter contained the following provisions: 
1. There is an overwhelming need for remission of the backlog of 
unpayable debts owed by highly indebted poor countries. Debt 
remission should relate to commercial, government, and IMF–World 
Bank debts and debt reduction should comprehensively include all three 
forms of debt. 
2. Creditors as well as debtors must accept responsibility for these high 
levels of indebtedness. 
3. The remission should be a one-off, unrepeatable act, tied to the 
celebration of the new millennium. It would set no precedents for future 
loans. 
4. The precise details of remission should be worked out in consultation 
with both creditors and debtors for each debtor country. 
5. These details should be agreed by arbitrators nominated in equal 
numbers by both creditor and debtor, under the aegis of the United 
Nations. 
6. Their deliberations should be transparent and well-publicized, taking 
into account for each debtor country, that country’s probity, economic 
management, social policies and human rights record. 
7. Funds available after the remission of debt should be channeled into 
policies which benefit the poor, in line with UNICEF’s 
recommendations for investment in social development. 
8. Low income countries—with an annual income per person of less that 
U.S. $700—should receive full remission of unpayable debt. 
9. Higher income countries—with an annual income per person between 
U.S. $700 and U.S. $2000—should receive partial remission.86 
The remission proposed was to be a one-off, unrepeatable act, tied to the 
celebration of the new millennium. It would have set no precedents for future 
loans. Beyond the general principle of debt forgiveness, the precise details of 
remission were to be worked on a country-by-country basis for debtor nations 
in consultation with both creditors and debtors. The details would have to have 
been agreed jointly by arbitrators nominated by both creditors and debtors, 
with United Nations supervision. The process was also supposed to be 
transparent and public, requiring debtor countries to address anticorruption, 
sound economic management, and other social policies, including the debtor 
nations’ overall human rights practices. 
In keeping with the general spirit of the Jubilee 2000 proposal, funds 
available after the remission of debt were to be channeled into policies which 
would have benefited the poor, in line with UNICEF recommendations for 
 
 86. Jubilee 2000, Jubilee 2000 Charter, http://gbgm-umc.org/umw/jubilee.html (last visited Sept, 16, 
2007). 
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investment in social development. The remission was also expected to be 
related to the longer-term economic prospects of the nations whose debt would 
be forgiven. Low-income countries—those with an annual income per person of 
less that US $700—were to receive full remission of unpayable debt. Higher-
income countries—those with an annual income per person between US $700 
and US $2000—were to receive only partial remission. “The Jubilee 2000 
Charter [was] offered as a model for a workable and acceptable solution to the 
problem of poor country debt, emanating from a global, grass roots movement. 
It [was hoped to] create a new, disciplined beginning for financial relations 
between North and South, as well as a fresh start for millions of the world’s 
poor.”87 
In the United States, the Jubilee USA Network began as Jubilee 2000/USA 
in 1997, when a diverse gathering of people and organizations came together in 
response to the international call for Jubilee debt cancellation. Eventually, over 
sixty organizations—including labor, churches, religious communities and 
institutions, AIDS activists, trade campaigners, and over 9,000 individuals—
became active members of the Jubilee USA Network. The advocates of this 
movement sought to create a strong, diverse network dedicated to working for a 
world free of debt for billions of people. In the view of its founders, 
international debt had become a new form of slavery. In their view this “debt 
slavery” also meant that hundreds of millions of the world’s poorest people had 
to work harder and harder in a futile effort to keep up with the interest 
payments on debts owed to rich countries including the U.S. and international 
financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. 
Partly in response to these efforts, the Clinton Administration took note of 
the indebtedness of the poorest nations and sought to relieve some of their 
burdens. Among President Clinton’s final acts as president was securing 
Congressional approval for a $435 million component within the foreign-aid bill 
of October 2000, to fulfill a pledge the United States originally made in 1996 at 
the Group of Seven (G-7) summit. At that time, the world’s seven richest 
governments agreed to finance a debt-relief plan for forty-one of the poorest 
third-world nations.88 
This plan—formally called the Debt-Relief Initiative for Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) and commonly referred to as the HIPC initiative—was 
announced by the G-7 countries in a predictable bout of self-congratulation and 
publicity. Yet, the plan’s serious shortcomings and the strings attached rendered 
it subject to almost immediate criticism by the most significant advocates of 
third-world debt relief.89 Many of them argued that most third-world debt was 
incurred by corrupt, unaccountable regimes; moreover, although the bulk of the 
loans were officially targeted toward large, wasteful infrastructure projects, the 
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 88. Rick Rowden, A World of Debt, AM. PROSPECT, July 2, 2001, at 29. 
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money more often was siphoned into private Swiss bank accounts of the top one 
or two hundred people surrounding the regime leaders. The lion’s share of the 
third world’s present debt represents not the principal, but rather the accrued 
interest on the original loans or the refinancing of them. 
By the turn of the millennium, third-world debt had come to be 
administered by the IMF and the World Bank, seen as controlled by the G-7 
governments. Under policies begun during the Reagan Administration and 
supported by Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, new economic thinking then-
prevailing turned these institutions into the “micromanagers” of dozens of 
third-world economies. Chief among their economic prescriptions was the 
reduction of the role of the state and an increasing role for private international 
investment in these countries’ economic development. 
Since this shift in the early 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank have based 
new loan-making on nations’ compliance with “structural-adjustment 
programs”—economic reform policies with a pronounced free-market bias. 
Only then will the IMF and World Bank authorize the release of additional 
bilateral and multilateral loans. Since nearly all private foreign investment goes 
to a small handful of emerging market economies—in recent years China has 
become the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world, 
surpassing even the United States—most poor nations depend entirely on 
bilateral or multilateral loans and foreign aid simply to service the interest 
payments on decades of previous debt. Yet these same poor nations must assure 
the IFIs that they are implementing the economic reforms at a satisfactory pace 
in order to have each “tranche,” or portion of the loan, released for their use.90 
As an international insolvency framework, the Jubilee framework sought to 
involve ordinary citizens in the resolution of international debt crises. The hope 
of its proponents was that this debt relief would be the first vital step towards 
democratizing international capital markets and the global economy as a whole. 
In their view, the deregulation of capital markets, from the late 1970s onwards, 
led them to become detached from democratic institutions in both creditor and 
debtor nation states. The insolvency framework they sought to introduce would 
have regulated and disciplined the flows of international capital through lending 
and borrowing. It was intended to do so not just in bankrupt states but also in 
other nations where lax lending and excessive borrowing could lead to 
bankruptcy. The very existence of the framework was expected to help regulate 
capital movements and prevent future crises.91 
The Jubilee 2000 call for debt cancellation was welcomed and supported by 
many in the developed West. For example, the public intellectual Noam 
Chomsky praised it, with some qualifications. He noted that the debt accrued 
does not go away; someone pays, and risks tend to be socialized, just as costs 
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 91. Debt Relief for the Poorest Countries, 21 CANADIAN J. DEV. STUD., No. 2 (John Serieux & 
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commonly are in the free-enterprise capitalist system.92 He was attracted to the 
complementary approach that responsibility falls upon those who borrow and 
lend. As Chomsky noted, in justifying the debt-relief initiatives, 
[t]he money was not borrowed by campesinos, assembly plant workers, or slum-
dwellers. The mass of the population gained little from the borrowing, indeed often 
suffered grievously from its effects. But they are to bear the burdens of repayment, 
along with taxpayers in the West—not the banks who made bad loans or the economic 
and military elites who enriched themselves while transferring wealth abroad and 
taking over the resources of their own countries.93 
With a similar rationale and purpose, campaigns were launched at the turn 
of the millennium by southern African economies still burdened by apartheid 
debt, a decade after the racist political system was abolished in South Africa. 
These campaigns claimed that the debts were “odious.”  This term was invoked 
in the hope that the doctrine of odious debt would impose a sort of 
international financial morality on the part of the IFIs and make them more 
responsible for the purposes to which their loans might be put.94  These 
campaigns go further and demand reparations for victims of apartheid, and they 
target banks in the West that continued to lend money to apartheid regimes 
even up to the close of their existence. Front line states also claim to qualify for 
debt relief because they had to borrow to protect, defend, and repair 
themselves from the aggression of the regime. 
VI 
NEW PROPOSALS FOR ODIOUS DEBT  
TREATMENT—CANDIDATES AND APPROACHES 
Two economists, Michael Kremer and Seema Jayachandran, have tried to 
revive the concept of odious debt as a means for dealing with past, current, and 
future debt crises, particularly those of some of the most corrupt, scandal-
ridden regimes from the past two decades. Potential recent examples of 
candidates for the label of “odious debts” identified by Kremer and 
Jayachandran95 include debts incurred in the following countries by the regimes 
such as 
1. Nicaragua (Anastasio Somoza reportedly looted $100–$500 million.) 
2. Philippines (Ferdinand Marcos amassed a $10 billion fortune.) 
3. Haiti (Duvalier regime was reported to have absconded with $900 
million.) 
 
 92. Noam Chomsky, Jubilee 2000, http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19980515.htm (last visited Oct. 
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4. South Africa (apartheid government spent heavily on police and 
military to repress majority population.) 
5. Congo (former Zaire) (Mobutu Sese Seko had personal accounts for 
$14 billion.) 
6. Nigeria (Abacha reportedly held $2 billion in Swiss bank accounts in 
1999.) 
7. Croatia (Tudjman looted unknown amounts, suppressed media, and  
attacked violently his political opponents.) 
As Kremer and Jayachandran note, at present countries repay even odious 
debts for several reasons.96 First of all, if they failed to repay, their assets abroad 
might be attached to make payments. Second, in the international community, a 
high priority is placed on reputational interests in not being perceived as 
defaulting on debt, or as financial scofflaws. Third, as countries such as Peru, 
Argentina, and Mexico have learned, there are real financial consequences of 
not being able to borrow in international markets if there were to be a default, 
whatever the reason. Finally, most developing countries have well-grounded 
fears of difficulty in attracting foreign investment if any public debts were 
repudiated. 
These real difficulties have led some analysts—including Kremer and 
Jayachandran—to conclude that the international community should try to 
establish an international institution which could impartially assess and 
definitively determine that certain debts or the regimes that contracted them 
were “odious.” This would be have to be done in advance, putting lenders on 
prior notice that successor governments would be justified in repudiating any 
new loans that would be advanced to such odious regimes. 
In an important contribution to the literature on this problem,97 they 
propose the creation of an institution that would truthfully announce whether 
regimes are odious and that could create an equilibrium in which successor 
governments would suffer no reputational loss from failure to repay odious 
debt. As a result, they hypothesize that creditors would curtail odious lending. 
Under their scheme, equilibrium with odious lending would be eliminated by 
amending creditor country laws to prevent seizure of assets for failure to repay 
odious debt and to eliminate current rules restricting foreign aid and other 
assistance to countries not repaying odious debt. They argue that shutting down 
the borrowing capacity of illegitimate regimes can be viewed as a form of 
economic sanction with two significant advantages over most sanctions: it helps 
rather than hurts the population, and it does not create incentives for evasion 
by third parties. Recognizing that an institution empowered to assess regimes 
might falsely term legitimate debt odious if it favored debtors ex post, and that 
creditors who anticipated this would not make loans to legitimate governments, 
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their proposal seeks to establish the odiousness of a loan ex ante. They posit 
that an institution empowered only to declare future lending to a particular 
government odious would have greater incentives to judge truthfully. They 
argue that this approach could also be used to reduce moral hazard associated 
with World Bank and IMF loans.98 
The legal issues are not insignificant. Among other things, the laws in 
creditor countries would have to be changed in some way to make odious debt 
contracts legally unenforceable, unless it were understood that courts might 
already apply general principles such as unconscionability or contra bonos 
mores to odious debt agreements. International financial institutions, such as 
the World Bank and IMF, would have to make it abundantly clear that they 
would decline the opportunity to bail out creditors disadvantaged by odious 
debt that was either repudiated or not repaid for other reasons. And the 
independent institution that would determine whether regimes are legitimate 
and whether their debts are obligations for successor regimes to pay must be 
structured in a manner that inspires global confidence. 
In a more recent article on odious debt, Kremer and Jayachandran argue for 
what they term “loan sanctions” to prevent the repayment of odious debts.99 
Loan sanctions, in contrast to an international institution which would decide 
the legitimacy of debts, could be self-enforcing and could protect the population 
from being saddled with “odious debt” run up by looting or repressive dictators. 
Governments could impose loan sanctions by instituting legal changes that 
prevent seizure of countries’ assets for nonrepayment of debt incurred after 
sanctions were imposed. This would reduce creditors’ incentives to lend to 
sanctioned regimes. Restricting sanctions to cover only loans made after the 
sanction were imposed would help avoid time-consistency problems. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
The obvious attractiveness of the concept of odious debt, and the possibility 
of its justifying repudiation of debts so denominated, belies the difficulty in 
establishing it as a settled matter in public international law. Almost a century 
after it was articulated by Professor Sack, and more than a century after it was 
first invoked following the Spanish-American War, it is often discussed (at least 
in academic circles) but infrequently asserted by debtor countries. 
The response of Latin American nations and the IFIs to the 1970s debt crisis 
illustrates the difficulties in employing the doctrine of odious debt. Whereas 
none of this addresses the question of whether the doctrine has become a 
principle of international law, after more than a quarter of a century has passed, 
it would be hard to argue that the doctrine of odious debt is now entrenched in 
customary international law. Rather, it remains an elegant legal construct 
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seeking great utility and more applicability to actual situations that it has 
enjoyed in the past. 
In considering the more recent Iraqi debt, Professor Stiglitz has also 
suggested that the United Nations could devise a set of principles based on the 
idea of “odious debt”—a rule of law—that would guide the court as it assessed 
the validity of contracts made with, and debts incurred by, outlaw regimes. 
Loans to build schools might be permitted, and the debt obligation, accordingly, 
would not be treated as odious; loans to buy arms might not be permitted. In 
some cases the court might decide that a loan for an ostensibly good purpose 
ran a high risk of being used for nefarious objectives—in which case the loan 
would be disallowed. Governments and banks that lend money to oppressive 
regimes would be put on notice that they risk not getting repaid, and the 
contracts and debts of countries with outlaw regimes would be re-examined 
once those regimes were no longer in power.100 Stiglitz went on to argue, 
If the United States expects the international community to work cooperatively on the 
reconstruction of Iraq’s economy, and to cut Iraq the slack it needs on its debts, then 
America must commit itself to something in return: the establishment of a framework 
for addressing debt relief, debt restructuring, and odious debts—a framework that 
includes an international court that can develop and enforce a set of widely agreed-
upon principles. Only with those principles in place will decisions seem fair. And 
without them the prospects for winning the peace in Iraq will further diminish.101 
The proposals of Kremer and Jayachandran take the next step in outlining 
what such a framework might become in institutional form. Although their 
recommendations have yet to be taken up seriously by the international 
community, they have generated a great deal of academic and public policy 
attention. No doubt part of their appeal is the terminology of odious debt, 
which evokes an immediate, visceral reaction and aptly describes the onerous 
financial obligations now burdening nations that have at long last shed the 
shackles of hateful, repressive regimes. Whether the proposed new 
international institutions will be created using the notions of odious debt 
remains to be seen. As the resolution of the Iraqi debt burden demonstrates, 
other mechanisms such as the Paris Club process can handle unpaid and 
unpayable sovereign debts on an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless, after more than a 
century, the concept of odious debt retains considerable strength and may yet 
be implemented in an international institutional form. 
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